Uneasy Triumph by Milfull, John
tEATURES 31
Uneasy
TRIUMPH
The collapse and integration of the old East Germany into 
a greater Germany is now history. Yet still, amid the 
triumph of the West German dream there is a sense of 
unease. And now the 'Ostis' are discovering the harsh 
realities of their choice. John M ilfull reflects on an 
extraordinary and disturbing 18 months.
istory repeats itself as farce: Marx's old 
intuition may well prove the best key 
to the understanding of the last 
eighteen months in Eastern Europe. In 
hindsight, it has become obvious that the Gor­
bachev faction not only tolerated but forced the 
pace of change in the governments of its Warsaw 
Pact allies-less, perhaps, from philosophical 
conviction than from the strategic calculation 
that the successful achievement of reforms in the 
rest of the "socialist empire" would present the 
hard-liners in the Soviet Union with a fa it  ac­
compli from which they could not resile.
The climax and turning point of this tragic farce was the 
extraordinary administrative bungle, back in December 
1989, in which, with one news release, Egon Krenz and 
Gunter Schabowski, the Laurel and Hardy of a reeling GDR 
leadership, blew themselves up along with the Berlin Wall 
and destroyed the possibility of a transition to democratic 
socialism in East Germany and Eastern Europe for the 
foreseeable future. The likely end of the farce: the fragmen­
tation of the Soviet Empire into a number of crypto-fascist, 
warring states, the total economic and political dominance 
of the Homogenised Republic of Germany, and the shrink­
ing of the heartland of die Russian Revolution to the bor­
ders of 1919.
I suspect it was no coincidence that in the last days of Nikita 
Krushchev rumours were rife of an approaching accom­
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modation with the Federal Republic of Germany; the "Ger­
man question", with varying signs, has dominated the 
entire history of the Soviet Union. One can only agree with 
Trotsky that a socialist revolution in Germany after the 
Great War would have had a profound impact on the 
course of the Soviet revolution and that the defensive 
isolation which was the breeding ground of Stalinism 
would, of necessity, have been replaced by a broader inter­
national perspective, for good or ill. What is clear to me is 
that the collapse of the GDR and of any cordon sanitaire 
between the ailing planned economies of Eastern Europe 
and the rapacious market economies of the West signalled 
the end, before it had even begun, of the realisation of 
Gorbachev's vision of "democratic sodalism" and a com­
mon European home. It was not the passing into history of 
the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance, but the removal of 
a leading player, the destruction of Comecon and the 
internal market between these countries which made frag­
mentation and total dependence on the West inevitable. 
Those commentators, across the political spectrum, who 
argued before 1989 for stability in Europe as the prereq­
uisite for democratisation and reform, have not been 
proved wrong; they will, I think, be increasingly vindi­
cated by a process which, in the name of democratisation, 
liberates some of the less attractive ghosts of the Eastern 
European past and turns the Warsaw Pact countries, to 
borrow George Markus' depressing phrase, (in ALR, May 
1990) into the Latin America of the EEC,
Precisely for these reasons, it is important to understand 
what happened in the GDR, in the course of this "licensed 
revolution", sanctioned and encouraged by the imperial 
power in Moscow. There is little doubt that, without this 
sanction, the undoubted courage of those tens of 
thousands of East Germans who took to the streets to 
demonstrate for democratic reform would have found 
difficulty in manifesting itself-a further farcical element 
which would have given Marx grim pleasure. The power 
which, at crucial stages in the East German development, 
had implacably blocked even the most timorous attempts 
at reform, was now their advocate. Just as, after 1945, the 
movement for an independent path to socialism had rapid­
ly been forced to accept the "superior wisdom and ex­
perience" of the Soviet exporters of revolution, the 
reformers of 1989 were compromised in advance by their 
dependence on the tolerance of the Big Brother against 
whose exported socialism they were protesting. One of the 
most distressing elements of the last years has been the 
unwillingness of the Soviet leaders to admit their own 
responsibility for the developments in Eastern European 
countries, and their willingness to blame their client states 
for not introducing reforms which they not only actively 
hindered, but opposed, at home. In the process, they have 
destroyed the last remnant of credibility of thousands of 
committed socialists who clung to the hope that they 
would one day be released from the constant interference 
and domination of their "Soviet brothers".
Was there a "revolution" in the GDR? If so, was it a "success" 
or a "failure"? What were its aims and origins? In 
retrospect, again, it is clear that two vastly different groups 
were involved, both exploiting the "winds of change" from 
Moscow, but in very different ways and for quite different
ends. The "democratic reformers" who took to the streets 
were motivated, above all, by the desire to reform the 
existing GDR, to create an independent, democratic 
socialist state which might enter, at a later date, into a 
federative arrangement with West Germany, but whose 
primary role would be to act as a catalyst for the develop- 
ment of a "third way” in Eastern Europe, a course between 
market capitalism and post-stalinism. Their primary and 
overriding aim was the establishment of civil rights, the 
restitution of the individual freedoms for which the first 
bourgeois revolutions had fought, and which had been 
withdrawn or ignored by "feudal socialism".
As far as one can tell, their membership, too, was entirely 
typical of such "democratic protest" movements, ranging 
from representatives of an alternative youth culture to 
concerned older citizens committed to democratic reform. 
Centred around the meeting places provided by a 
Lutheran Church shaped by its own need to atone for the 
collaborations of the Third Reich, they developed a clearly 
articulated program of non-violent reform which shared 
many features with the undogmatic socialist and ecologi­
cal movements in the West. Although I do not wish to 
broach the question here as to the extent to which class 
divisions persisted in the GDR, it seems utterly ap­
propriate to describe this movement qualitatively as a 
"bourgeois intellectual" protest movement. Whether it can 
be described as "revolutionary" is another matter entirely; 
the overwhelming consensus that only non-violent 
strategies were appropriate to the situation in theGDRand  ̂
the rejection of all chauvinist and aggressive tendencies 
certainly mark it off distinctly from other protest move­
ments in Eastern Europe. If it was a "revolutionary" move­
ment, one must say, with considerable sorrow, that it was 
an unambiguous failure; at the crucial moment, its aims, , 
strategies and visions were pushed aside by developments 
over which it had no control, I will always remember the 
wry grin with which a studentatthe East Berlin theological 
seminary, who was trying to help me find someone mom 
the New Forum movement for Bruce Petty to interview in 
December 1990, said sadly: "It won't be easy. Last year we 
demonstrated, this year we are studying. We have no 
choice.”
At their demonstrations, the protesters constantly ap­
pealed to the other group, those who had already deserted 
to the West through the emerging cracks in the socialist 
alliance. "Come back", they cried, "help us build i 
democratic GDR together. Without you we will have no 
chance." The appeal was addressed, of course, not only to 
those who had a!ready lef t, bu t to those who were planning ! 
to leave. Until the collapse of the Wall, this was a relatively 
defined group with weak social ties, largely un- or and* 
political, whose motivation was primarily frustration with 
the economic stagnation and the greyness of everyday life 
in the GDR, contrasted with the images of Western af­
fluence with which they were constantly bombarded. They I 
were little interested in socialism, or even democracy, but 
in the prospect of a better life in terms very similar to those 
in which the average citizen of Australia or New Zealand 
would define it. They were the vanguard of the silent 
majority which began to speak with one voice only afta 
the collapse of the Wall and the realisation that it was no
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The breach that started a flood.
longer necessary to make the radical break with homes, 
friends and possessions the first refugees had taken on 
themselves. Unimaginably, the mountain-or should I say 
paradise with its houris—could and would come to 
Mohammed.
archives of the dreaded state security service I found in 
Halle, and which seems to me to sum up, in its inimitable 
style, the drab resignation life held for these people before 
1989:
The silent majority and its vanguard were ‘'bourgeois" in a 
different sense: they wanted, above ail, the restoration of 
the right to individual affluence, to the good life, release 
from the constant restrictions and inefficiencies of GDR 
life, and access to the magic of Western consumer goods. 
Perhaps here I can counterpoint my images of thousands 
of East Germans thronging the streets of West Berlin in 
search of video recorders and stereos with a note from the
[Comrade Otto Jacob] wished to inform me that he 
had been elected chair of theTrade Union Committee 
of the State and University Library despite 23 votes 
against him from the bookstacks. These seem to have 
resulted from an argument with A Hochheim from 
the Loans section, who took the fact that the lift was 
out of service (for nine months) as an occasion for 
politically negative comments in the 35th year since 
the foundation of the GDR. She doubts that things 
are improving in the GDR.
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The juxtaposition of A Hochheim's fury at a broken-down 
lift with the pompous party phrase "in the 35th year since 
the foundation of the GDR" is the farcical expression of the 
abyss between party rhetoric and the reality of everyday 
life to which Erich Honecker had fallen victim after a very 
disturbed 40th birthday party for the GDR, soon to be 
followed by his entire regime.
Sadly, it was not fear of the democratic protest movement 
which forced Krenz and Schabowski to open the Wall, but 
fear of the massive defection of the silent majority or its 
alliance with the democrats in street protests which would 
rapidly leave the earlier self-imposed limits behind. The 
GDR leadership could no longer afford the wave of defec­
tions to the West, economically or politically; it had left any 
move to liberalisation far too late, and was discredited both 
at home and abroad. After the opening of the Wall, in the 
form that it took, the democratic protest movement was 
doomed, their rallies broken up and dominated by the new 
voices of those who wanted the West to come to them as 
soon as possible. The process was irreversible, and the 
ignominious failure of the communists to come to terms 
with the situation discredited not only the ruling party, but 
any group which included even a passing reference to 
socialism in its platform. The debacle of the elections 
proved that the vast majority of the GDR population was 
simply not interested in political issues; all they wanted 
was incorporation in Western consumer society, and they 
cared little under what banner, and with which slogans, it 
was achieved. Kohl and Genscher needed no further pro­
gram than this. How, when and if it will be achieved is 
another matter entirely.
A startled West German leadership began to realise in 1989 
that the fossilised demands for reunification, which 
remained enshrined in the Republic's Basic Law, but which 
had long ceased to be a focus for its real concerns, were 
likely to be translated into reality. It became clear that some 
rapid rethinking was necessary. Many of the Kohl 
governemnt's reactions were simply dictated by political 
pragmatism: it was evident from the beginning that any 
talk of German reunification would need to be embedded 
in the rhetoric of European union, given new impetus by 
Gorbachev's vision of a wider Europe, if it were not to 
unsettle and alienate both West Germany's EEC allies and 
her Eastern European neighbours. Kohl pursued this line 
without much subtlety, occasionally stumbling over sen­
sitivities of which he seemed unaware, but with extraordi­
nary perseverance and eventual success.
It is interesting and, I think, important to speculate both on 
the reasons for this single-minded pursuit of a goal which, 
from the beginning, had been something of a national 
fig-leaf for the Christian Democrats, whose West German 
regionalism and unambiguous loyalty to Western Europe 
was never really in doubt, and for its acceptance by West 
Germany's allies and neighbours. Again, I think it is fair to 
say that these reasons are fundamentally economic and 
politically pragmatic, rather than being rooted in any 
deeply felt commitment to a German nation, however 
defined. There is little doubt that it rapidly became clear to 
Kohl that unification offered him a quite unexpected
and retaining government. He was not slow to take ad­
vantage of this opportunity. In the longer term, the creation 
of a massive new arena for the export of West German 
products and expertise, for all the short-term disad­
vantages and "start-up costs”, was an offer too good to 
refuse for a government increasingly concerned about the 
stability of the world market and heavily dependent on its 
export performance to underwrite prosperity at home. 
East Germany was the key to Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union.
This insight quickly communicated itself to the Federal 
Republic's EEC allies and its Eastern European neigh­
bours. The initial political reservations of France and 
England were soon replaced by the realisation that they 
could not afford to stand aside from this "sale of the cen­
tury” if they wished to share in its profits and prevent 
Germany "going it alone", with the consequent even 
greater dominance in Europe and the EEC that would 
bring. With even greater pragmatism, the Warsaw Pact 
states, with far deeper scars from a different German past, 
rapidly arrived at the conviction that the destruction of the 
internal market left them no alternative but to seek the 
assistance of the EEC-spearheaded and co-ordinated by 
the West German economic machine—to rebuild their col­
lapsed economies. There have been a number of bitter 
diplomatic pills to swallow, but it has to be said that 
Genscher, and even Kohl, have shown an increasing ability 
to demonstrate the gradousness of the victor, even match­
ing Vadav Havel's apology for the mistreatment of Czech 
Germans after the war with the acknowledgment that 
there were some reasons for this which led outside 
Czechoslovakia.
Nearly everyone has commented on the "national 
reticence" with which this extraordinary project has been 
carried out. Even the East German crowds' slogan 
Deutschland einig Vaterland (Germany—united father­
land) was characterised less by passion than impatience: 
What do we want? Affluence! When do we want it? Now! 
I have pointed out that there were obvious pragmatic 
reasons why the West German government needed to play 
down any component of nationalistic fervour and cover it 
with a sugar-coating of Europeanism. Nevertheless, it is 
demonstrable that there was, in fact, very little nationalistic 
content,atleastofatraditionalkind,in the pill to be coated. 
It is surely significant that the ceremony in Berlin to mark 
unification was so unsure of its symbolism and purpose 
that it might easily have been mistaken for a church synod 
or an attempt to demonstrate the success of equal employ­
"The vast m ajority  o f the 
GDR population was simply  
not interested in po litica l 
issues"
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ment opportunity policies, had it not been for that quite 
extraordinary scowl on the Chancellor's face when an 
unbidden guest threatened to disturb the pre-ordained mix 
of calm, culture and boredom. The only real slogan that 
could be read out of the proceedings was bu siness as usual; 
good business, and morally responsible business, it goes 
without saying.
Why then did I feel so acutely uncomfortable and sceptical 
in Oxford last year when a British colleague, projecting a 
not dissimilar middle-class self-satisfaction, tried to con­
vince us that West German nationalism was a quantity 
n£gligcable, that German nationalism had died with the 
passing of the Third Reich? I suppose he merely provoked 
the same scepticism I would bring to the proposition that 
the collapse of the empires after World War D brought with 
it the end of imperialism and the liberation of the colonised. 
Itis a commonplace to observe that, just as one of the major 
reasons for the abolition of slavery was the increasing 
conviction that it was bad business, the exploitation of the 
previous colonies has progressed with far greater efficiency 
and an infinitely improved image since they ceased to be 
colonies in name. The latecomers to empire, Germany and 
japan, have achieved through trade and finance a 
dominance which makes their earlier attempts to enter the 
club by military means appear coarse, misguided and 
thoroughly outmoded.
West German national pride is well aware of the taboos of 
history, and has from the beginning sought new forms to 
express itself. Some of these have a clear fig-leaf function: 
the claim, for instance, to be the best "Europeans” and the 
only really "modem" European state, which has freed itself 
of traditional baggage, asserts a position of leadership in 
an ingenious and sanitised way. But no one who has ac­
companied the West Germans through their post-war saga 
as long as I have will doubt that the major displacement of 
this national pride has been into the economic sphere, 
anticipating the lessons of the world's greatest treasurer 
before he even thought of them. Reconstruction and 
prosperity became (as they had once before, after the failure 
of 1848) the cherished national aims; as Peter Weiss formu­
lated them in 1964, through the perspective of the 
Napoleonic restoration, "the right to enrich onself in a 
process of happy mutual exploitation-every man his own 
Croesus". The political downside of this rather Darwinian 
ethic is heavily masked following Bismarck's insights from 
the Second Reich, by exemplary social welfare legislation 
which maintains the market and the sodal order. But there 
is no doubt anyone who critidses the shared myth of 
prosperity and sodal justice will provoke a response of 
panic, hysterical overreaction and intense aggression.
What impact will the homogenisation of Germany—I prefer 
the term to unification, which suggests some kind of grow­
ing together-have on this defensive, displaced, but never­
theless strong sense of national pride? It should first be 
pointed out that it is in many ways a spedfically West 
German national pride, and will not easily extend itself to 
the brothers and sisters from the East who will be told by 
the owners of four bedroom villas and multiple Mercedes 
that they must leam to work as "we" do, if they want to 
share in the benefits of the German dream. After all the
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rhetoric about the liberation of the enslaved peoples of the 
East, there is remarkably little sympathy for the conditions 
under which they had to live and work, or willingness to 
help: they must be put through the cold shower of the 
market, must somehow repeat a West German post-war 
experience beyond the recall of most of those who advocate 
it, before they can be admitted on equal terms. It seems to 
have been conveniently forgotten that Eastern Europe 
shared a far worse post-war experience than West Ger­
many, and that the same West Germans who condemn the 
inefficient work practices and laziness of their brothers and 
sisters in the East were the first to condemn a system which 
nrodnred these attitudes. The moral rieonr with whirh
“They must be pu t through  
the c o ld  shower o f the 
m arket... before they can  
be adm itted  on equa l 
terms '1
perhaps the least revolutionary nation in the world seems 
to require of its new fellow-citizens that they should have 
taken the path of active resistance when it was most 
dangerous to do so, is nothing short of astonishing.
And the Easterners, the "Ossis", to whom I feel such a 
strong bond? They are learning to understand economics. 
I went to a shoestring cabaret in Halle with my friends; one 
of the sketches summed it up nicely. "We have the right to 
do anything we like, to buy anything we like, but no money 
to do it with." I was reminded of one of the ironic slogans 
of post-war years: "Now we're democrats, now we can 
starve!" I suppose that, after a sufficient period of chasten­
ing, the Ossis will be admitted to the groaning table of West 
German affluence, but they will be made to feel their place 
for some years to come. The question that no-one can 
answer will the inevitable breaking of Chancellor Kohl's 
promise that “no-one will be worse off’, that homogenisa­
tion will cost no-one anything, revive that other shy, con­
torted and complex growth, East German national pride? 
How long will an unemployed and unequal population 
continue to accept that their efforts of 40 years were worth­
less, useless and somehow morally wrong? I suspect that 
there is a small bone hidden somewhere in the 
homogenised steak on which someone, before too long, 
will break a tooth or two. Forgive me for expressing such 
an unworthy doubt about the total and utter triumph of 
German know-how. As a friend in Munich said when I 
visited her last yean "If we pull this off, you'll really- have 
to respect us.” I had trouble with both the "we” and the 
"you", which are indefinite plurals of a kind of which I am 
deeply suspicious.
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